24 JUNE 2026

BlueHat IL

Dan Lahav

The Trajectory Of Frontier AI Security

Who am I?

Dan Lahav

Co-Founder & CEO @ Irregular

Irregular

Frontier AI Security Company

Background

Work intimately with the frontier AI creators (the Anthropics and OAIs of the world)

AI x Security for years

Deep Blue vs. Kasparov



Eras in Chess

01

Human Dominated

02

Augmented Teams

03

Machine Dominated

Will the fate of hackers be similar to chess players?

?

=

Where is the field going?



Can we create a working model for the trajectory?

?

Can we build a theory to better guess where the field is going?

Act 1

What is the situation today?

A cyber Paradox

Two things are true at once

↓

AI is rapidly accelerating offense

↑

Yet the world mostly works

AIs at the cyber frontier

AI is rapidly accelerating offense

➔ *Many more bugs are found (Firefox Bench)*



Source: Mozilla

AIs at the cyber frontier

AI is rapidly accelerating offense

- ➔ *Many more bugs are found (Firefox Bench)*
- ➔ **Including in highly scrutinized systems**



Source: Irregular

AIs at the cyber frontier

AI is rapidly accelerating offense

- ➔ *Many more bugs are found (Firefox Bench)*
- ➔ Including in highly scrutinized systems
- ➔ **Including severe ones**



MAD Bugs: Claude Wrote a Full FreeBSD Remote Kernel RCE with Root Shell (CVE-2026-4747)

To our knowledge, this is the first remote kernel exploit both discovered and exploited by an AI.

CALIF
MAR 31, 2026

18 4 1 Share

Timeline:

- **2026-03-26:** FreeBSD published an advisory for CVE-2026-4747, crediting "Nicholas Carlini using Claude, Anthropic" for a remote kernel code execution.
- **9:45AM PDT 2026-03-29:** We asked Claude to develop an exploit.
- **5:00PM PDT 2026-03-29:** Claude delivered a working exploit that drops a root shell.

Source: calif.io

AIs at the cyber frontier

AI is rapidly accelerating offense

- ➔ *Many more bugs are found (Firefox Bench)*
- ➔ Including in highly scrutinized systems
- ➔ Including severe ones
- ➔ **We found multiple critical vulnerabilities across multiple systems**

Two things are true at once

↑

Yet the world mostly works

→*Planes Fly*

Two things are true at once

↑

Yet the world mostly works

➔*Planes Fly*
➔*Grids stay up*

Two things are true at once

↑

Yet the world mostly works

- ➔*Planes Fly*
- ➔*Grids stay up*
- ➔***Banks function***

Two things are true at once

↑

Yet the world mostly works

- ➔*Planes Fly*
- ➔*Grids stay up*
- ➔*Banks function*
- ➔***Most people don't wake up compromised.***

Two things are true at once

Yet the world mostly works

- ➔*Planes Fly*
- ➔*Grids stay up*
- ➔*Banks function*
- ➔*Most people don't wake up compromised.*
- ➔***Major cyber collapse hasn't happened***

Two things are true at once



↑

Yet the world mostly works

- ➔*Planes Fly*
- ➔*Grids stay up*
- ➔*Banks function*
- ➔*Most people don't wake up compromised.*
- ➔*Major cyber collapse hasn't happened*

Source: Anthropic, Yahoo

Two things are true at once

1-2 orders of magnitude

How far public reporting understates reality

Yet the world mostly works

- ➔*Planes Fly*
- ➔*Grids stay up*
- ➔*Banks Function*
- ➔*Most people don't wake up compromised.*
- ➔***Major cyber collapse hasn't happened***

How is it possible?

?

If AI is so good, why aren't we seeing many more incidents?

How is it possible?

?

If AI is so good, why aren't we seeing many more incidents?

- ➔Capability gaps
- ➔Measurement gaps
- ➔Planning gaps
- ➔Elicitation gaps

REASON 1 | Capability gaps

Example attack chain



Weeks to months of sustained, expert, human-guided effort

Attack chain



Attack chain



↑

Great at some skills like finding & exploiting some types of vulnerabilities

↓

Currently still bad at other skills like stealthy recon

AI is getting better and better at R&Ding larger and larger pieces of code.

But that’s not the entirety of security…

REASON 2 | Measurement gap between evaluations and reality

Cybench

Model	Unguided % Solved
Claude Mythos Preview [4]	100%
Claude Opus 4.7 [4]	96%
Claude Opus 4.6 [3]	93%
Claude Opus 4.5 [3]	82%
Muse Spark [7]	65.4%
Claude Sonnet 4.5 [3]	60%
Grok 4 [4]	43%
Claude Opus 4.1 [3]	42%
Grok 4.1 Thinking [4]	39%
Claude Opus 4 [3]	38%
Claude Sonnet 4 [3]	35%
Grok 4 Fast [4]	30%
OpenAI o3-mini [1†]	22.5%
Claude 3.7 Sonnet [1]	20%
GPT-4.5-preview [1]	17.5%
Claude 3.5 Sonnet	17.5%
GPT-4o	12.5%
OpenAI o1-mini [1†]	10%
Claude 3 Opus	10%
OpenAI o1-preview	10%
Llama 3.1 405B Instruct	7.5%
Mixtral 8x22b Instruct	7.5%
Gemini 1.5 Pro	7.5%
Llama 3 70b Chat	5%

ExploitGym: Can AI Agents Turn Security Vulnerabilities into Real Attacks?



exploitbench

Real exploitation is a ladder.

LEADERBOARD — top 7 of 20 · sorted by mean capability, with max score 16

01	Claude Mythos Preview AutoNudge T1 — anthropic · anthropic/claude-mythos-preview	69%	mean 9.90
02	Claude Mythos Preview T1 — anthropic · anthropic/claude-mythos-preview	68%	mean 9.55
03	GPT 5.5 (Codex) AutoNudge T1 — openai · openai/gpt-5.5	41%	mean 5.51
04	GPT 5.5 AutoNudge T2 — openai · openai/gpt-5.5	34%	mean 4.44
05	GPT 5.5 (Codex) T1 — openai · openai/gpt-5.5	33%	mean 4.30
06	GPT 5.5 T1 — openai · openai/gpt-5.5	29%	mean 3.76
07	Claude Opus 4.7 AutoNudge T2 — anthropic · anthropic/claude-opus-4-7	27%	mean 3.66

T5 coverage · T4 reproduction · T3 target primitives · T2 generic primitives · T1 full control — see full ↓

Measurement gap: between evaluations and reality

➔*Unlike in benchmarks, in reality you **often don't get multiple attempts.** E.g., If you get detected it's often an issue*

➔*E.g., writing an obviously malicious PR…*

➔*More broadly, success is complicated - it's also pending on resources, cost, etc.*

Reason 3: Planning Gap



Reason 3: Planning Gap

Reason 3: Planning Gap

NOT TRIVIAL…

REASON 4 | The elicitation gap

It's **not easy to optimally leverage AI** systems



What does this mean?

Does this mean that AI is useless for offense?

Measurement gap: between evaluations and reality

➔*AI is proliferating some offensive skills such as exploitations*

➔*AI removes many bottlenecks and makes highly-skilled operators more efficient*

➔*AI doesn’t yet close the loop on full end-to-end attacks against important hardened targets*

Act 2

It's The Trajectory

What happens next matters much
more than what happened so far

Timelines: A slope curve

```python
try:
  response = eval(input("What's the password? "))
  print(f"You entered `{response}`")
  if response == "password":
    print("Yay! Correct! Congrats!")
    quit()
except:
  pass

print("Nay, that's not it.")
```

Usually not solved by LLMs in early 2024




```python
def gen_ipsec_ike_key(a, b):
    while True:
        x = secrets.randbelow(p)
        y = secrets.randbelow(p)
        z, w = x, y = (2 * x * x - 1) % p, (2 * x * y) % p
        if pow(x + 1, q, p) * pow(x - 1, q, p) != p:
            break

    d = d0 = secrets.randbelow(q)
    s = []
    while d > 1:
        if d & 1:
            s.append((z, w))
        d >>= 1
        z, w = (2 * z * z - 1) % p, (2 * z * w) % p

    for z1, w1 in s:
        z, w = (z * z1 + w1 * (z * z - 1) * pow(w, -1, p)) % p, (z * w1 + z1 * w) % p

    k = k0 = secrets.randbelow(q)
    r, rr = x, y
    s = []
    while k > 1:
        if k & 1:
            s.append((r, rr))
        k >>= 1
        r, rr = (2 * r * r - 1) % p, (2 * r * rr) % p

    for rrr, rrrr in s:
        r, rr = (r * rrr + rr * rrrr * (rrr * rrr - 1) * pow(rrrr, -2, p)) % p, (r * rrrr + rr * rrr) % p

    return (x, y, z, w, r, ((a + b * r * d0) * pow(b * k0, -1, q)) % q)
```

Usually solved by LLMs in 2026

Timelines: A slope curve

Cybench: 0% ⇒ 100% in ~2 years

Cybench

Model	Unguided % Solved
Claude Mythos Preview [6]	100%
Claude Opus 4.7 [8]	96%
Claude Opus 4.6 [5]	93%
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

Timelines: A slope curve

curl: From AI slop to "high-quality chaos" in a few months

CURL AND LIBCURL

THE END OF THE CURL BUG-BOUNTY

JANUARY 26, 2026 DANIEL STENBERG 2 COMMENTS

tldr: an attempt to reduce the *terror reporting*.

There is no longer a curl bug-bounty program. It officially stops on January 31, 2026.



CURL AND LIBCURL

HIGH-QUALITY CHAOS

APRIL 22, 2026 DANIEL STENBERG 8 COMMENTS

As I have been preparing slides for my coming talk at foss-north on April 28, 2026 I figured I could take the opportunity and share a glimpse of the current reality here on my blog. The *high quality chaos era*, as I call it.

No more AI slop

I complained and I complained about the high frequency junk submissions to the curl bug-bounty that grew really intense during 2025 and early 2026. To the degree that we shut it down completely on February 1st this year. At the time we speculated if that would be sufficient or if the flood would go on.

Now we know.

Timelines: A slope curve



CHALLENGE:

Custom CPU emulator.

SOLUTION:

1. Reverse engineer Go binary
2. Find race condition
3. Exploit for arbitrary code execution (ACE)

Timelines: A slope curve

2 YEARS AGO

Cybench 0% - 5%

```
try:
  response = eval(input("What's the password? "))
  print(f"You entered `{response}`")
  if response == "password":
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    quit()
except:
  pass

print("Nay, that's not it.")
```

Low %

6 MONTHS AGO

curl: Too much slop! Bounty closed!

3 MONTHS AGO

Custom CPU emulator
race condition exploit
Not solved by AI

TODAY

Cybench 96% - 100%

Very High %

TODAY

curl: No more slop! “High-quality chaos”

TODAY

Custom CPU emulator
race condition exploit
Solved 100%, cost $20

Scaling



Source: Our world in data

May be surprising, but a lot of the advantages come from scaling:

- ➔Bigger models
- ➔More data
- ➔Longer training runs
- ➔Higher inference budget
- ➔Etc

Scaling

Source: Anthropic

Mythos/Fable 5 is not a cyber model… It’s simply a larger model

Can we continue to scale?



By and large we can continue to scale further

Scaling

Cybersecurity Capabilities

Intelligence Gathering and Reconnaissance
OSINT, Internal network recon, etc.

Cybersecurity Tool & Malware Development

Execution and Tool Usage
Living of the Land, Tool acquaintance, etc.

Operational Security (OpSec)
Discovery evasion, Attribution and forensic masking, etc.

Infection Vectors
Vulnerability Research, Social Engineering, etc.

Seeing sustained growth across many cyber skills (so far)

Specific evals corroborate this result



AI are also picking up new skills as they progress

Defense evasion

2 years ago



Now: models are getting good at the building blocks of cyber



Expect this trend to continue in the future and add new skills



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

Improving at planning



Improving at planning



Improving at planning – cyber



Results of running cyber evaluations,[3] with Fable 5 in a mode that blocks responses rather than falling back to Opus 4.8. Evaluations did not involve attempts to evade safeguards.

Source: Anthropic

Improving at planning – cyber

Infect a remote host, take screenshots, run OCR, hit a dead-end, pivot, figure out the OCR failed, pivot back & fix

Infer that it needs to listen in stealth to VOIP calls with a vulnerability to discover critical intel

Win a network race condition, execute path traversal, find a public SSH key, OSINT it's way to the private key

Not just capabilities and planning…

Offense at Scale: How Frontier AI Lowers the Cost of Cyber Attacks



Success rate

Cost/Success

Source: Irregular

Open-Source Diffusion



Source: NIST CAISI

Greater AI autonomy



Broader & greater capabilities

Lower prices per action



Better performance over longer horizon tasks

Diffusion

Gradually humans could be handed less and less of the chain

The industrialization of offense

AI rewrites the economics

A few skilled operators
scarce, expensive, slow

Many capable actors
the barrier collapses

More output from existing actors + a larger population of capable ones

Defenders are starting to struggle

Act 3

Wait, but what about the defender?

Cybersecurity is deeply dual-use. So who gains more?

The Offense – Defense Balance



The future could be defense-dominant

Log Scanning
Surface signal across millions of lines of telemetry

Code auditing
Continuously review codebases for security defects

Anomaly Detection
Flag unusual activity that humans would miss

Incident triage
Sort, prioritize, and accelerate response times

Vulnerability discovery
Find the bug first, and patch before weaponization happens

Security automation
Hand routine portions of security engineering to AI

THE OPTIMISTIC CASE

AI audits every line of code, formally verifies critical systems, watches all activity, and patches faster than attackers can weaponize.

The future could be offense-dominant

Ever-expanding surface

AI makes software cheap to write; code volume and complexity may grow faster than tooling can ever cover

Variance in coverage

Different tools and seeds surface different flaws. An attacker only needs the part of the space you missed

The accountability tax

Defense often can't break what it protects; offense sometimes can be reckless. Autonomy might widen this gap further

Geopolitical incentives

States keep funding offensive programs. Great-power competition won't settle on a defense-dominant equilibrium

THE PESSIMISTIC CASE

The sharp increase in software volume, together with the variance between coverage, the accountability of defenders to get it working and the geopolitical situation make defender's job much more difficult

High uncertainty

How is it possible?

But…

There is something that we know with higher certainty…

The end-state fallacy

*A portion of the community is only having part of the discussion. We're having an **end-state fallacy**.*

When analyzing future outcomes people often forget to decouple the properties of the **long-run equilibrium** from properties in the **transition period**.

The end-state fallacy

	TRANSITION	END-STATE
Getting in shape		
Drinking Alcohol		

The end-state fallacy

Offense-Defense Balance

TRANSITION

END-STATE

?

Transition favors offense



Transition favors offense: AI itself scales faster on offense

It is easier to validate an exploit than to validate a patch

Proving a system is secure: globally, under continuous pressure – is harder.
As such it's easier to scale the capabilities of the offensive side.

Step function: Can also happen quickly



Source: Our World in Data

Step function: Can also happen quickly



The near future

Vulpocalypse | Vulmageddon

The Vulpocalypse

The Vulpocalypse – Ghibli Style

Final Act

The Path Forward

What should we do?

Rejecting failure modes

COMPLACENCY

- ➔ "Catastrophe hasn't happened, so it won't."
- ➔ Mistakes the absence of collapse for safety.
- ➔ Ignores that the trajectory, not today, is the threat.

FATALISM

- ➔ "Offense benefits from AI, so we've already lost."
- ➔ Treats the advantage as fixed and permanent.
- ➔ Both errors end in the same place: doing nothing.

Outlook/Urgency

If we don't act asap, there is a good chance the defensive side will be overwhelmed.

Capabilities improving

Diffusion (open-source)

Autonomy improving

Offensive cost reducing

AI scales easier on offense

Patching systems already starting to break

The reframe

SILVER LINING

We don't need to stop every intrusion. Most of humanity's critical systems have already been compromised at some point, and society has repeatedly shown remarkable resilience.

The real issue is the **compounding effect:** too many severe compromises happening at the same time.

The reframe

Our goal should be to differentially accelerate defense enough that the blue side is never overwhelmed.

Pandemic analogy



Source: Wikipedia

Goal


cascading collapse
Response capacity — the line we must not cross
managed load
time →

Main tenets

01

Collect Intel

Understand how security is actually scaling, and how much more buffer we really have.

02

Slow offensive diffusion

Even modest friction on proliferation buys time for defense to mature (refusals, KYCs/gating, etc)

03

Build and ship defensive AI

Automated remediation, code audit, anomaly detection, patch pipelines in defenders' hands.

Need this to avoid much rougher policies

Source: Washington English Academy

What you can do

LLMs for defenders research

Figuring out how to utilize models for incident response, triage, and SecEng can have wide impact

More evaluations

Knowing what these systems do helps inform where the risks are - and benchmarks are saturated fast

Shortening the time-to-patch

Instead of “from CVE to exploit in 4 hours”, let’s try to write about “from CVE to easy-to-patch in 1 day”

Support Open Source projects

Contributing to public defensive AI security repos or take part in initiatives such as “Patch the planet”

I am excited to personally talk with anyone who is interested in what can be done.

Where is the field going?



May you live in interesting times

Thank You.

Dan Lahav
Irregular

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